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NECCESSITY OF PLEADING NONJOINDER OR MISJOINDER OF

PARTIES IN ABATEMENT.-In a recent West Virginia case,1
involving the question of misjoinder of plaintiffs in an action

of ejectment, the first paragraph of the syllabus contains
the 'following statement:
"Such a defect as nonjoinder or misjoinder of parties

must be made the subject of a plea in abatement.

If a

party goes to trial without filing such plea, he thereby

waives the defect."
So far as this statement is based on common-law prin-

ciples, it would seem difficult to reconcile it with the authorities. Independently of statutes, only two instances are
recalled where either a nonjoinder or a misjoinder of parties must be pleaded in abatement in order to save to any
party or parties to the litigation rights that they would
I Hunt v. Mounts, 133 S. E. 328 (W. Va. 1926)-
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of
otherwise lose. 2 These two instances are nonjoinder
8 and nonjoinder of tort plaintiffs. 4
defendants
contract
If a nonjoinder of contract defendants is not pleaded in
abatement, judgment is simply taken. against those who are
sued as if they were the sole promissors; while if there is a
nonjoinder of contract plaintiffs, the contract is excluded
from the evidence on the ground of variance between the
allegations and the proof. Originally, there was a like
exclusion in the case of a nonjoinder of contract defendants,
but, beginning with the leading case of Rice v. Shute, it has
been held that objection to the nonjoinder is waived unless
pleaded in abatement. It is said that proof that the defendant promised with another is not inconsistent with
the allegation in the declaration that he himself promised,
and hence there is no variance. 6 If this conclusion is logi-7
cal, it is rather difficult, as indicated in some of the cases,
to conceive why proof that the promise was made to the
plaintiff and another is inconsistent with the allegation in
the declaration that it was made to the plaintiff. However,
another reason is urged why a distinction should be made
between plaintiffs and defendants. It is said that the defendant ought to know who are his co-contractors and, if
one is nonjoined, should be allowed to object only by plea in
abatement, so as to set the plaintiff right at the beginning
of the action; but that he may be ignorant as to who are
proper parties plantiff, and hence should be permitted to
raise the objection of nonjoinder of plaintiffs at the trial,
where he may for the first time be informed by the evidence
that the nonjoinder exists." Whatever the logic or justification of the distinction, it seems to have been almost if not
universally recognized since the decision of Rice v. Shute.
When there is a nonjoinder of tort plantiffs, if the nonjoinder is not pleaded in abatement, the defendant can
raise no objection on account of it, but those who have sued
will recover only damages proportionate to the interest
which they have in the subject matter of the litigation (ordinarily, an undivided interest in property), and the non28 W. VA. L. QuAn. 197-212, 266-286, and authorities cited.
Idem, 208-212, and authorities cited.
Idem, 277-279, and authorities cited.
5 5 Burr. 2611 (1870).
1 See Inhabitants of Richmond v. Toothaker, 69 Me. 451 (1879).
7See Snellgrove v. Hunt, 1 Chitty's Reports 71 (1819).
3
4

8 Ide.
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joined party may bring his separate action to recover for
the damage done to his interest. 9 By failure to plead the
nonjoinder in abatement, the defendant is assumed to have
consented to separate actions and an apportionment of the
damages.
It will be noted that the question in the principal case
does not involve a nonjoinder of tort plaintiffs, but a misjoinder of tort plaintiffs; and hence its solution cannot be
aided by the exception discussed in the preceding paragraph.
In the principal case, the court refers to the Virginia
statute, 10 enacted in 1919, largely conforming to the provisions of the English and New Jersey practice acts, which
provides that "no action or suit shall abate or be defeated
by the nonjoinder or misjoinder of parties, plaintiff or defendant," and so deprives the defendant even of his plea
in abatement which the common law permits in such cases.
The results intended to be accomplished by this radical
statute, of course, are entirely in derrogation of the common
law, and would seem to be irrelevant in the absence of a
West Virginia statute of similar import. Referring to the
subject matter of the Virginia statute, the court says, "In
our state there is no express statute on the subject." By
using the word "express," the court seems to imply that
there may be a statute in this state which by implication or
approximation tends to accomplish the results intended by
the Virginia statute. It is seemingly for some such purpose that the court then proceeds to quote from the following section of the West Virginia Code :11
"No plea in abatement, for the nonjoinder of any person as a codefendant, shall be allowed in any action,
unless it be stated in the plea that such person is a resident of the state, and unless the place of residence of
suclh person be stated with convenient certainty in an affidavit verifying the plea."
0 "In actions in form ex delicto, and which are not for the breach of contract, if
a party who ought to be joined be omitted, the objection can only be taken by plea in
abatement, or by way of apportionment of the damages on the trial; and the defendant
cannot, as in actions in form ex contractu give in evidence the non-joinder,-as the
ground of nonsuit on the plea of the general issue or demur or move in arrest of
judgment, or support a writ of error, though it appear upon the face of the declaration,
or other pleading of the plaintiff, that there is another party that ought to have been
joined: and if one of several part-owners of a chattel sue alone for a tort, and the
defendant do not plead in abatement, the other part-owners may afterwards sue alone
for the injury to their undivided shares, and the defendant cannot plead in abatement
of such action." TucxR, COMMENTARIES (1837 ed.) 222.
29 VA. CODE, 1919, §6102.
* W. VA. CODE, c. 125, §17.
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It is believed that this section is to no extent a substitute
for the Virginia statute, so far as the manner of raising objection to a nonjoinder or misjoinder of parties is concerned. Nor, it is believed, does this section in any manner
change the common-law rules determining when a plea in
abatement is or is not necessary for the purpose of objecting to a nonjoinder or misjoinder. First of all, it will be
noted that the operation of the statute is confined to nonjoinder of defendants, while the principal case is concerned
with misjoinder of plaintiffs. A careful reading of this
section will disclose that, even in the case of nonjdinder of
defendants, it was not the intention of the statute to pre-,
scribe a plea in abatement as the exclusive method of objecting to the nonjoinder. In fact, the draftsmen of the
statute- evidently recognized and assumed the common-law
rule prescribing a plea in abatement as the normal and
only method of objecting to a nonjoinder of defendants,
when the nonjoinder does not appear on the face of the
declaration, and the object of the statute is simply to enumerate certain matters which such a plea shall contain, if
it is used. Where a nonjoinder of defendants appears on
the face of the declaration, in spite of the statute, and in
spite of any dicta to the contrary, the defendant may still
object by demurrer, motion in arrest of judgment, or on
writ of error. 2
Referring to the section above quoted, the court in the
principal case says:
"This was the statute in the Code of 1860, and in
Urton v. Hunter, 2 W. Va. 83, construing this statute, it
was held that it applied to where other parties were improperly included (as in the case here) as well as where
there was a nonjoinder of parties."
This statement would seem to be erroneous. The statute
referred to in the principal case (section 17 of chapter 125,
quoted above), is not mentioned in Urton v. Hunter, the case
cited by the court as construing it, and seems to have had no
influence in,the decision of the case. The statute discussed in
Urton v. Hunter is section 19 of chapter 131 which reads as
follows:
"In an action founded on contract, against two or more
defendants, although the plaintiff may be barred as to
28 W. VA. L. QuAR. 203-212, and authorities cited.
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one or more of them, yet he may have judgment against
any other or others of the defendants against whom he
would have been entitled to recover, if he had sued them
only, on the contract alleged in the declaration."
In Urton v. Hunter,the plaintiff, Urton sued Hunter, Harris
and McCullough as partners engaged in business under the
firm name of Hunter, Harris & Company. Harris, who was
the only defendant served with process, pleaded nil debet
and filed an affidavit denying the partnership. At the trial,
the evidence showed that Hunter, Harris and Thompson, instead of Hunter, Harris and McCullough, constituted the
members of the partnership. Consequently, the case involved a nonjoinder and a misjoinder of a party defendant.
Thompson was nonjoined and McCullough misjoinded.
Objection to the nonjoinder, of course, was waived because
it was not pleaded in abatement. This result came from the
common law and not from the statutes. There remained,
however, the question of the misjoinder and the court was
called upon to decide whether judgment could be taken
against Harris in pursuance of section 19 of chapter 131,
quoted above, regardless of the misjoinder. Although the
opinion of the court is not entirely clear in all its details,
it seemingly was in effect decided that the latter statute
did not aid the situation because Urton would not have
been entitled to recover against Hunter and Harris if he
had sued them alone, they being entitled in that event to
plead the nonjoinder of Thompson in abatement. The
court furthermore, evidently reverting to purely commonlaw principles, says:
"But in addition it is very clear that the contract declared on and the contract proved are different and distinct contracts, and the variance, therefore, is fatal, with
or without the statute."
The fact is that there was no plea in abatement in the
case of Urton v. Hunter and the court expressly decided in
that case that the defendant could take advantage of the misjoinder without having pleaded it in abatement. The unfortunate feature of Urton v. Hunter is not the results reached
on the basis of the facts involved, but the unnecessary and
unwarranted general statement of the law contained in the
second paragraph of the syllabus, which in part reads as
follows:
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"Where a part of the copartners only are sued, or other
parties improperly included, it is matter to be pleaded in
abatement for nonjoinder or misjoinder ** * * "
This language may be taken to imply that nonjoinder or
misjoinder of parties can be taken advantage of only by
plea in abatement, and it apparently was so construed in
the principal case.
The unfortunate dictum in Urton v. Hunter was some years
later repeated in Rutter v. Sullivan,8 but when, as late as
1916, in Harris v. North,14 the court was asked to apply the
dictum in the actual decision of a case, it was flatly repudiated.
In the latter case, referring to the dictum in Urton v. Hunter
and Rutter v. Sullivan the court says:
"In neither case, could the court have given the matter
mature consideration. An assumption of identity of misjoinder and nonjoinder of defendants, in legal effect,
seems to have been hastily adopted without inquiry or
attempt at verification. This assumption is clearly erroneous. At common law, nonjoinder of defendants was
ground of abatement, and, if not pleaded, it was waived.
I Chitty, P1., II Am. ed., 4647. Misjoinder of defendants
did not have to be pleaded in abatement. When it appeared in proof under the general issue, it was matter
calling for a nonsuit and not ground of abatement. I
Chitty, P1., II Am. ed., 44, 45; 15 Encyc. P1. & Pr., 582;
I. C. J. 131; 5 Rob. Pr., 72."
The conclusion of the court is generalized in the syllabus of
the case as follows:
"Misjoinder of defendants in an action of assumpsit
is not pleadable as matter of abatement of the action, but
is matter of defense under the general issue."
A year later, in Bolyard v. Bolyard,15 the question came up
again for actual decision. A wife had sued her husband
and his father on a bond which they had executed to her
as obligee. The husband undertook to plead the defense
of coverture in abatement. The court, holding the plea in
abatement'improper, states the law as follows:
"Misjoinder of defendants in an action is not pleadable
as matter of abatement. It is matter of defense, admis25 W. Va. 427 (1885).
14 78 W. Va. 76, 88 S. E. 603, 1 A. L. R. 856 (1916).
79 W. Va. 554, 91 S. E. 629 (1917).
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sible under the general issue. For that reason, it is not
proper matter of a plea in bar."
16
Space will not permit a further review of the cases.
Cases dealing with misjoinder of defendants have been
selected for comment because it has happened that in these
cases the court has found an opportunity particularly to
state and emphasize the true common-law rule and at the
same time to repudiate the contrary dicta of prior decisions.
Moreover, what has been said as to misjoinder of defendants must, under the general rules as to joinder of parties,
apply with all the more force to misjoinder of plaintiffs. 17
It should be noted, however, that the statements in the
principal case, like the statements in the earlier cases of
Urton v. Hunter and Rutter v. Sullivan, may perhaps be regarded as dicta, since the court decided that there was in
fact no misjoinder of parties.
-L. C.
10 For other cases and authorities, see 28 W. VA. L. QUAR. 197-212, 266-286.
1? The rule as to misjoinder of tort plaintiffs is thus stated in TucKER, COMsEXTARIS (1837 ed.) 222:
"If too many persons be made co-plaintiffs, the objection, if it appears on the
record, may be taken advantage of either by demurrer, in arrest of judgment, or by
writ of error; or if the objection do not appear on the face of the pleadings, if would
be a ground of nonsuit on the trial."

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1926

7

